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PART I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter "ADA")
was enacted "to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individu-
als with disabilities."1 The purpose of the ADA is to "ensure
equality of opportunity" and "legal redress" for persons with dis-
abilities. 2 With regard to employment, the ADA is intended "to
remove barriers which prevent qualified individuals with disa-
bilities from enjoying the same employment opportunities that
are available to individuals without disabilities." 3 Yet a con-
struction worker with ventricular tachacardia, which leaves
him periodically unconscious due to an irregular heartbeat, is
not protected under the Act.4 A registered nurse who develops
multiple sclerosis is terminated from her position in a hospital
1. ADA of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
2. Id. § 12101(a) (1994).
3. Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Class: Redefining the Scope of
Disability Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 107, 107
(quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1996)).
4. See Hurley v. Modern Continental Constr. Co., Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 183,
185-86 (D. Mass. 1999).
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intensive care unit, although she fails to fall under the ADA def-
inition of "disabled."5 An epileptic whose medication still leaves
him suffering from periodic petit mal seizures does not fall
within the definition of disability.6 All were fired or failed to be
hired for jobs with no recourse under the ADA, pursuant to the
United States Supreme Court decision on June 22, 1999 in Sut-
ton v. United Air Lines Inc.7 Sutton narrowed the scope of disa-
bilities by ruling that lower courts must consider mitigating
measures when making a determination of whether an individ-
ual is disabled.8 Prior to Sutton, federal circuit courts were di-
vided on the issue, with most courts holding that the
determination should be made without regard to mitigating
measures. 9 In the aftermath of Sutton, practitioners and legal
scholars are left with unanswered questions that predate the
case, as well as new issues specifically raised by the decision.
In Sutton, along with two sister cases decided the same
day, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of disabilities to
exclude those impairments which, when corrected, do not "sub-
stantially limit a major life activity."10 In each of these cases,
Sutton, Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.," and Albertson's,
Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 12 a divided Supreme Court held that, when
determining whether a person is disabled under the ADA, the
impairment must be considered in its mitigated state. 13 A miti-
gated state is accomplished by compensating for the disability
with corrective measures such as medications, rehabilitation,
aids, devices, or by "the body's own systems."14
Part II of this note discusses the history of the ADA, its
definitions, prior case decisions regarding medically controlled
impairments and societal effects of the Act. 15 Part III provides
a comprehensive overview and analysis of Sutton v. United Air
5. See Sorensen v. Univ. of Utah Hosp., 194 F.3d 1084, 1085-86 (1999).
6. See Todd v. Academy Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 448, 453-54 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
7. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
8. See id. at 475.
9. See id. at 477.
10. Id. at 481.
11. 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999).
12. 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999).
13. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
14. Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 566.
15. See infra notes 20-87 and accompanying text.
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Lines, including the facts, the holding, and the dissent. 16 Part
IV explores the future implications of the decision for practi-
tioners, as well as employers and employees, and provides an
important look at how courts will apply the ADA in future
cases. 17 Part V concludes with a final thought on clarification of
the ADA in light of the Sutton ruling.
PART II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT -
BACKGROUND AND INTERPRETATION
A. Purpose of the Act
The Americans with Disabilties Act of 1990 prohibits dis-
crimination against disabled individuals, specifically in the
area of employment.' 8 The main objective of Title I of the ADA
was to "extend to the private sector those protections against
disability discrimination in employment already afforded the
public sector by the Rehabilitation Act."19 "With the legal
framework for protection against discrimination already in
place in the Rehabilitation Act, Congress, and subsequently the
[Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] and courts, bor-
rowed heavily from the statute in setting out the parameters of
the ADA."20 The purpose of the ADA is to protect disabled indi-
viduals from discrimination "in all phases of life, including em-
ployment, public services, and public accommodations." 21 The
goal is to provide equality in the employment setting to individ-
uals with disabilities, who are "a discreet and insular minority,"
and who have been "relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society" because of "stereotypic assump-
tions not truly indicative of [their] individual ability."22 The
ADA provides the disabled person with enforcement powers
parallel to those used in addressing violations of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 for discrimination based on race, color and
national origin.23 Discrimination is described in the ADA as
16. See infra notes 88-146 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 147-322 and accompanying text.
18. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
19. See Locke, supra note 3, at 110.
20. Id. at 110.
21. Id. at 107.
22. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994).
23. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2 (a)-(f) (2000).
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"limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee
in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status" of
such employee because of his disability.24 The Act further de-
fines discrimination as "participating in a contractual or other
arrangement... that has the effect of subjecting a... qualified
applicant.. .with a disability to the discrimination" such as a
"labor union ... or [a] training ... program;" 25 "utilizing stan-
dards, criteria or methods of administration"26 that "perpetuate
the discrimination;"27 "denying employment opportunities ...
[to] an otherwise qualified individual;"28 "using qualification
standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that
screen out" disabled individuals; 29 and failing to make "reasona-
ble accommodations" for the disabled individual."30 Congress
expressly provided that the purpose of the ADA "is to provide
clear, strong, consistent enforceable standards addressing dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities."31
B. Legislative History of the Act
The definition of disability in the ADA was taken almost
verbatim from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.32 The ADA states
that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such in-
dividual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, ad-
vancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of em-
ployment."33 The terms set forth in the main provision of the
ADA are further defined in other sections of the statute,34 in the
implementing regulations issued by the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission ("EEOC"),35 in the Rehabilitation Act of
24. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (1994).
25. Id. § 12112(b)(2).
26. Id. § 12112(b)(3).
27. Id. § 12112(b)(3)(B).
28. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(B).
29. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (1994).
30. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
31. Id. § 12101(b)(2).
32. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
34. See id. § 12102; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1994).
35. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1-1630.16 (2000).
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1973,36 in state disability statutes, 7  and in judicial
interpretations.38
C. Definitions Under the ADA
The elements of a prima facie case for disability discrimina-
tion are: (1) the plaintiff is "a disabled person within the mean-
ing of the ADA; (2) she is qualified to perform the essential
functions of the job in question with or without reasonable ac-
commodation; and (3) the employer terminated her or treated
her differently from others who were similarly situated."39 A
three-prong test emerged to determine the existence of a disa-
bility under the ADA definition: "Disability" means "(A) a phys-
ical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such
an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment."40
The first prong requires a determination of whether an in-
dividual meets the threshold of being physically impaired
within the meaning of the Act.41 A "physical impairment" is de-
fined as "[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic dis-
figurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the
body's systems."42 The term has been construed broadly, so that
a person with any kind of physical condition will generally be
found to have a physical impairment. 43 A mental impairment
is, likewise, defined broadly as "any mental or psychological dis-
36. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
37. See The Americans With Disabilities Act: Great Progress, Greater Poten-
tial, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1602, at 1604.
38. See id.
39. Locke, supra note 1, at 111-112. See also McCrory v. Kraft Food Ingredi-
ents, 98 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1996).
To prevail on an ADA claim, a plaintiff must prove that the employer "termi-
nated him, or subjected him to an adverse employment action 'because of his disa-
bility." Heiser v. Genuine Parts Co., 900 F. Supp. 1137, 1151 (D. Minn. 1995).
40. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
41. Locke, supra note 3, at 110-11.
42. Id. at 110. The following body systems are included in the statute:
"[Nleurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and
lymphatic, skin, and endocrine." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)(1996).
43. See Locke, supra note 3 at 110. For instance, obesity and dyslexia have
been held to be a physical impairment. See id. at 146, n.29.
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order. .. ,44 The statutory phrase "substantially limits" is de-
fined by the EEOC regulations as "unable to perform a major
life activity that the average person in the general population
can perform."45 A "major life activity" is defined by regulation
also, and includes basic, necessary human "functions such as
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."46 In or-
der to prove that he is substantially limited in a major life activ-
ity, an individual must show that an impairment renders him
(1) "[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform"; or, that he is (2)
"[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or dura-
tion under which [he] can perform a particular major life activ-
ity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under
which the average person in the general population can perform
that same major life activity."47 Certain conditions, by judicial
interpretation or regulatory guidelines, are generally not con-
sidered disabilities. 48 For example, "common personality traits
such as poor judgment or a quick temper" and normal devia-
tions in "height, weight, or muscle tone" do not constitute disa-
bilities.49 Likewise, temporary conditions such as "broken
limbs. . .concussions, [and] appendicitis" are not disabilities
under the ADA.50 Current illegal drug use does not generally
constitute a disability, but alcoholism does. 51
In addition to being disabled, an individual must be quali-
fied for the particular job that he is applying for or has been
terminated from.52 "Otherwise qualified" individuals with disa-
bilities are defined by the ADA as those who "with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
44. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2000).
45. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (2000).
46. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2)(i) (2000).
47. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i-ii) (2000).
48. The Americans With Disabilities Act: Great Progress, Greater Potential,
supra note 33, at 1609-10.
49. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (2000).
50. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (2000).
51. See The Americans With Disabilities Act: Great Progress, Greater Poten-
tial, supra note 37, at 1609-10.
52. See id. at 1610.
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of the employment position."53 In Tyndall v. National Educa-
tion Center,5 4 the fourth circuit held that an employee who was
not able to meet the attendance requirements of his job was not
considered to be "otherwise qualified" for the job under the
ADA.55 Likewise, in Carrozza v. Howard County Maryland,56
an employee diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, who was unable
to maintain an objectively acceptable standard of professional
behavior in the workplace, was held not to be "otherwise quali-
fied."57 To be "otherwise qualified," an individual must be capa-
ble of performing the essential functions of the job.58 Any
written description or advertisement that precedes the inter-
viewing of applicants is considered evidence of the essential
functions of the job.59
When the "major life activity" under consideration is that of
working, the statutory phrase "substantially limits" requires
that the individual be "significantly restricted in the ability to
perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes as compared to the average person having comparable
training, skills, and abilities."60 For instance, a hospital em-
ployee with carpal tunnel syndrome, who was unable to perform
only one job, that of hospital cook, was not considered disabled
under the ADA.61 Factors to be considered in determining
whether an impairment is substantially limiting under the
ADA include: "(1) the nature and severity of the impairment; (2)
the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (3)
the permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent
or long term impact . . .of the impairment."62 An impairment
must disqualify a person from "a class of jobs or a broad range of
53. See The Americans With Disabilities Act: Great Progress, Greater Poten-
tial, supra note 37, at 1610 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)).
54. 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994).
55. See Buchanan Ingersoll, P.C. How to Hire Right and Fire Right Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (visited Sept. 17, 1999) <http://www.lawoffice.
corn>.
56. 45 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 1995).
57. See Jean Gaskill, Americans With Disabilities Act -An Analysis of Devel-
opments Relating to Disability Law, 508 PLI/Lit 973, 995-96 (1994).
58. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1990).
59. See id.
60. 29 CFR § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2000).
61. See Crumpton v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 963 F. Supp. 1104, 1113-14 (N.D.
Ala. 1997).
62. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2) (2000).
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jobs in various classes" to be substantially limiting for the pur-
pose of determining whether an individual fits the definition of
disabled under the ADA.63 For example, if an individual's medi-
cal restrictions make it impossible for him to safely perform the
tasks of the position he has applied for, but there are other
available job openings consistent with his medical restrictions,
that employee is not "substantially limited."64 Requiring cer-
tain physical criteria for an employment position is not violative
of the ADA.6 5 An employer is "free to decide that physical char-
acteristics... that do not rise to the level of impairment.., are
preferable to others," and as long as they are not substantially
limiting, that certain impairments may "make individuals less
than ideally suited for a job."66
The legislature has recognized that persons with disabili-
ties may not be unable to perform a job in exactly the same way
that non-disabled persons would perform it, thus employers are
required to make reasonable accommodations for disabled em-
ployees.67 Reasonable accommodations may include:
making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities; and job-restructuring;
part-time or modified work schedules; reassignment to a vacant
position; acquisition or modification of equipment or devices; ap-
propriate adjustment or modifications of examinations . . . and
other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. 68
An employer may demand medical proof of the disability
and information regarding the form of accommodation re-
quired.69 The employer need not provide the best possible ac-
commodation, reallocate essential job functions, create a new
position for the disabled person, or place him in a position for
which he is not qualified."70 For instance, in Larkins v.Ciba Vi-
63. Id. at § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
64. See Brand v. Florida Power Corp., 633 So. 2d 504, 509 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
65. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 490 (1999).
66. Id. at 490-91.
67. See The Americans With Disabilities Act: Great Progress, Greater Poten-
tial, supra note 37, at 1604-1606.
68. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(i-ii) (2000).
69. See How to Hire Right and Fire Right Under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, supra note 55.
70. See id.
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sion Corp.,71 it was not considered a reasonable accommodation
to eliminate stressful telephone work from a customer service
job.72 It was not a reasonable accommodation because it would
require eliminating the essential function of the job, i.e., an-
swering customer complaints over the telephone.
73
D. Defenses By Employers
Employers have a defense in certain situations for failing to
accommodate individuals with disabilities. 74 Such a defense
may be available where the situation would "impose an undue
hardship on operations;" where selection standards are "consis-
tent with business necessity;" 75 or where the employer is able to
show that employing the individual would cause a "direct threat
to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.
76
The employer has the burden of proving undue hardship. 77 Fac-
tors that may be considered with regard to whether a reasona-
ble accommodation creates an undue hardship include: expense
of the proposed accommodation relative to the individual's sal-
ary; number of employees in the firm; financial resources; and
overall impact of the accommodation on the operation of the fa-
cility. 78 The determination of whether a disabled individual has
an impairment which poses a "direct threat" to himself or other
employees is an individualized inquiry.79 It requires that the
employer balance the "nature, severity and duration of the risk"
against the probability that it will occur and the severity of the
harm if it does occur.80 He must also consider the modification
of employment practices that would serve to mitigate the risk.8'
71. Larkins v. CIBA Vision Corp., 858 F. Supp 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
72. See id. at 1582.
73. See id.
74. See The Americans With Disabilities Act: Great Progress, Greater Poten-
tial, supra note 37, at 1605-07.
75. Id. at 1606.
76. Id. at 1607.
77. See Eric Wade Richardson, Who is a Qualified Individual With a Disabil-
ity Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 189, 198-99
(1995).
78. See id. at 196.
79. See How to Hire Right and Fire Right Under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, supra note 55.
80. See id.
81. See id.
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E. Record of a Disability
The second prong of the ADA protects persons who have a
record of a disability.8 2 If an employer discriminates against an
individual on the basis of historical records, the individual is
protected even though he does not meet the first prong of the
definition.8 3 The provision also protects persons who have been
misclassified with a disability.8 4
F. "Regarded As" Having a Disability
The third criteria that allows an individual to fall within
the definition of disability is being "regarded as" disabled by an
employer.8 5 Persons fall within this definition when either (1)
an entity perceives an impairment that is not substantially lim-
iting as constituting a "substantially limiting impairment" or
(2) the impairment is only limiting because of the "attitudes of
others" or (3) an entity mistakenly believes that a person has "a
substantially limiting impairment."8 6
PART III. SUTTON V. UNITED AIR LINES -
PROCEDURAL HISTORY, FACTS, ANALYSIS
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, the Supreme Court decided
the issue of whether corrective or mitigating measures should
be considered in determining if an individual is substantially
limited in a major life activity and thus disabled within the
meaning of the ADA.87 The petitioners in Sutton were twin sis-
ters, both of whom were severely myopic, and were rejected for
employment as commercial airline pilots.88 Though each plain-
tiff had an uncorrected visual acuity of 20/200 or worse in one
eye and 20/400 or worse in the other, "with corrective measures,
such as glasses or contact lenses, 'both function[ed] identically
to individuals without a similar impairment.' 8 9 Their employ-
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1995).
83. See 29 CFR § 1630.2(k) (current through September 29, 2000).
84. See id.
85. The Americans With Disabilities Act: Great Progress, Greater Potential,
supra note 37, at 1608.
86. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (current through September 29, 2000).
87. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999).
88. See id. at 475-76.
89. Id. at 475.
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ment interviews were terminated and they were told that, al-
though they met all other Federal Aviation Administration
("FAA") certification requirements including age, education and
experience qualifications, they would not be considered for em-
ployment as global airline pilots because of their failure to meet
the airline's minimum vision requirement of an uncorrected vis-
ual acuity of 20/100.90 In response to their rejection for employ-
ment, the plaintiffs filed suit under the ADA in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Colorado. 91 The petitioners alleged that
the respondent had "discriminated against them 'on the basis of
their disability or because [respondent] regarded [them] as hav-
ing a disability' in violation of the ADA."92 Specifically, petition-
ers argued that because of their severe myopia, they were
substantially limited in a major life activity or were regarded as
disabled by the entity, and thus fell within the definition of a
disability under the Act.93
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.94 Because pe-
titioners could fully correct their visual impairments, the court
held that they did not fall within the meaning of disabled as
defined by the ADA. 95 Moreover, the court held that petitioners
had not supported their allegations that they were "'re-
garded'... as having an impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity."96 The court observed that "an employer 're-
gards an employee as handicapped in his or her ability to work
by finding the employee's impairment to foreclose generally the
type of employment involved." 97 Because petitioners had al-
leged only that the respondent regarded them as unable to sat-
isfy the requirements of the specific position of commercial
airline pilot, the court reasoned that they "had not stated a
claim that they were regarded as substantially limited in the
major life activity of working."98 The Court of Appeals for the
90. See id. at 475-76.
91. See id.
92. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 476.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 476.
96. Id.
97. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 477.
98. Id.
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Tenth Circuit affirmed, using a similar analysis. 99 Because the
decision differs from opinions of other courts of appeals, certio-
rari was granted, 100 and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in a
7-2 decision authored by Justice O'Connor.1 1
The Supreme Court reasoned that the applicants were not
disabled within the ADA definition because they could fully cor-
rect their visual impairment with corrective measures.10 2 The
Court analyzed that three provisions of the ADA, when read in
concert, lead to the conclusion that "if a person is taking mea-
sures to correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impair-
ment, the effects of those measures - both positive and negative
- must be taken into account" when determining whether that
person is disabled under the Act. 0 3 First, "the phrase 'substan-
tially limits' appears [in subsection (2)(A) of the ADA] in the
present indicative verb form." 04 The language must therefore
be "read as requiring that a person be presently - not potentially
or hypothetically - substantially limited" to fall under the defi-
nition of disability. 0 5 Consequently, a disability does not exist
where an impairment "'might,' 'could,' or 'would' be substan-
tially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken."10 6
Second, the Court reasoned that the language in subsection
(2)(A) "requires that disabilities be evaluated 'with respect to an
individual' and be determined based on whether an impairment
substantially limits the 'major life activities' of such individ-
ual."10 7 Therefore, the question of whether a person has a disa-
bility under the ADA is an "individualized inquiry." 08 The
individualized inquiry runs counter to the EEOC guidelines
that state that the determination of whether an impairment is a
disability "must be made on a case by case basis, without regard
to mitigative measures such as medicines, or assistive or pros-
thetic devices." 10 9 The Court reasoned that the EEOC's case by
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 474-75.
102. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488-89.
103. Id. at 482.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 480 (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j)).
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case approach was "contrary to both the letter and spirit" of the
ADA. 110 The majority argued that the guidelines would create a
system where persons would be "treated as members of a
group... with similar impairments, rather than as individu-
als.""' It might also lead to the result that courts could not con-
sider negative side effects resulting from corrective measures,
"even when those side effects are very severe."112
Additionally, the Court relied on the congressional finding
that some 43,000,000 Americans have at least one disability, 1 3
prompting the conclusion that the legislature must not have in-
tended to bring under the ADA's protection all of those uncor-
rected conditions that amount to disabilities, as the group
would include more than 160 million people." 4 Therefore, since
the petitioners alleged that they had 20/20 vision when using
corrective lenses, the Court held that they are not "substan-
tially limited" in the "major life activity" of working, as required
under the ADA's definition.115
Finally, respondents successfully argued that the petition-
ers were not "regarded as" having a substantially limiting im-
pairment by United Air Lines, as they alleged they were only
excluded from the specific job of global airline pilot, and only
because of a specific requirement that its pilots have uncor-
rected 20/100 vision.116 Claims that fit the third prong defini-
tion of disability generally arise when an employer mistakenly
believes that an individual has a substantially limiting impair-
ment." 7 Petitioners argued that United Air Lines has an unac-
ceptable vision requirement "based on myth and stereotype,"
and that respondent mistakenly believes that due to their poor
vision, petitioners are unable to work as commercial airline pi-
lots.1 18 The Court reasoned that merely failing to meet physical
criteria for an employment position, without more, does not con-
110. Id. at 483-84.
111. Id. at 483-84.
112. Id. at 484.
113. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484-85. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1).
114. See id. at 487.
115. See id. at 489.
116. See id. at 493.
117. See id. at 489-90.
118. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489-90.
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stitute regarding the individuals as disabled. 119 The ADA per-
mits employers to decide that certain physical or medical
attributes are more ideally suited to a job, as long as the attrib-
utes are not substantially limiting impairments within the
meaning of the ADA. 120 In addition, the Court held that peti-
tioners had not met the burden of proving that they were re-
garded as substantially limited in the major life activity of
working. 12' The Court explained that when the major life activ-
ity under consideration is working, the ADA requires that an
individual allege that she is unable to work "in a broad class of
jobs." 22 The Court found the EEOC guideline's definition of
"substantially limited" to mean "significantly restricted in the
ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs
in various classes as compared to the average person having
comparable training, skills and abilities." 23 Since working was
the major life activity at issue, the Court held that the petition-
ers' allegations were insufficient because they were excluded
only from the single job of global airline pilot.124 The Court held
that, although the petitioners might be excluded from working
as global airline pilots at other airlines, a variety of other posi-
tions were available to them, such as regional pilot or flight in-
structor. 125 In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg agreed that
the ADA does not cover individuals with corrected disabilities
because those persons are not a "discreet and insular minor-
ity"... "subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment
and . . . political powerlessness." 26
In the dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer,
approached the analysis as a two part question of statutory in-
terpretation. 27 The first part was whether it was the intent of
Congress for the determination of a disability to focus on the
impairment in its mitigated or unmitigated condition. 128 The
119. See id. at 493-94.
120. See id. at 490-91.
121. Id. at 493.
122. Id. at 491.
123. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491.
124. See id. at 493.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 494 (Ginzburg, J., concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)).
127. See id. at 495 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 495.
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second part was, in the event that Congress intended that the
impairment should be judged "without regard to ameliorative
measures," should the general rule be applied to a condition
which "might be characterized as a 'minor, trivial
impairment."1 29
The dissent acknowledged that Congress did not intend to
require airline companies to hire unsafe pilots, but argued that
the petitioners' uncorrected vision was entitled to ADA protec-
tion.130 Based on customary rules of statutory construction, the
"threshold question [of] whether an individual is 'disabled'
within the meaning of the Act... focuses on her past or present
physical condition without regard to mitigation that has re-
sulted from rehabilitation, self-improvement, prosthetic de-
vices, or medication. " 131 According to the dissent, the issue in
this case is not whether the petitioners fit into the definition of
disability, but whether they "can perform the job of an airline
pilot without presenting an undue safety risk."' 32 The question
is simply "whether the ADA lets petitioners in the door in the
same way the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
does for every person who is at least 40 old [citation omitted]
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does for every sin-
gle individual in the work force."' 33 Once past the threshold,
the employee is protected from "irrational and unjustified dis-
crimination because of a characteristic that is beyond a person's
control."134 This places the burden on the employer to come for-
ward with some legitimate explanation for refusing employ-
ment, in order to determine if the employment action is
motivated by irrational fears and stereotypes associated with
the disability. 135 One might argue, the dissent acknowledged,
that the general rule should not apply to a minor impairment
such as a nearsighted person needing glasses, but "it has long
been a rule 'of statutory construction that remedial legislation
should be construed broadly to effectuate its purpose." ' 136
129. Id. at 496 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. See id. at 495.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 503-04.
133. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 504 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. Id. (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1997)).
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The dissent went on to state that three executive agencies
have interpreted the ADA to mean that impairments should be
considered in their uncorrected state. 137 Their analysis cen-
tered on the legislative intent and the purpose of the ADA. 138
They reasoned that, in surveying legislative history, all the re-
ports and guidelines make it clear that the ADA intended to
define disability in its unmitigated state. 139
The dissent further argued that the majority in Sutton re-
lied too heavily on the congressional findings that "some
43,000,000 Americans [citation omitted] have one or more phys-
ical or mental disabilities," and that Congress, therefore, could
not have intended to include persons whose impairments were
correctable. 40 The fact that the legislature may not have fore-
seen that the ADA would encompass "not just some 43,000,000
Americans, but perhaps two or three times that number," does
not necessarily exclude all persons whose impairments are cor-
rectable.14' In fact, the Court's "narrow approach may have the
perverse effect of denying coverage for a sizable portion of the
core group of 43 million."142 Likewise, it does not imply a 43
million cap on the Act's protected class, since the categories "re-
cord of' and "regarded as" show that "Congress fully expected
the Act to protect individuals who lack, in the Court's words,
'actual' disabilities."1 43 Congress expressly provided that the
purpose of the ADA "is to provide a clear... national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities."14 The holding "appears to exclude from the Act's
protected class individuals with controllable conditions such as
diabetes and severe hypertension," individuals whom the ADA
was expressly designed to protect. 145
In his dissent, Justice Breyer argued that if the EEOC
thought it necessary, then it could draw more narrow defini-
tional lines as to what constitutes a disability, excluding indi-
137. See id. at 501.
138. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 499.
139. Id. at 499-500.
140. Id. at 494 (quoting the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1990)).
141. Id. at 495.
142. Id. at 512.
143. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 512.
144. Id. at 504 (quoting the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1990)).
145. Id. at 512.
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viduals with minor or trivial impairments such as "those with
certain vision impairments who readily can find corrective
lenses."1 46 He further stated that the Court should give defer-
ence to the standards set out by the EEOC. 147
PART IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUTTON V. UNITED
AIR LINES - UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND
NEW AMBIGUITIES
By redefining the scope of disabilities protected by the
ADA, the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines has left
a stream of questions with which future litigants and practi-
tioners will have to grapple. Additionally, many ambiguities
never clarified before Sutton remain unclear after the decision.
In an attempt to bring forth the issues with which courts will
undoubtedly be presented and required to further clarify, this
analysis will provide a roadmap to future employment litigation
under the ADA.
A. Definition of impairments and standards used to assess
whether an impairment is corrected or mitigated
The Sutton case's controlling precedent demonstrates the
need for more exacting definitions and standards. Black's Law
Dictionary defines "mitigation" as "to make less severe."148
"Corrected," by contrast, means "to make right or exact." 49 As is
frequently the case with statutes and regulations, "one defini-
tion begets several more." 150 The Sutton decision failed to clar-
ify the standard that courts should apply in determining what
constitutes mitigation and correction, and whether the two
terms are synonymous, or whether there is a subtle but critical
difference between them.
The dissent in Sutton anticipated some of the future
problems that would arise with regard to measuring the impair-
ment in its corrected state.' 5' Depending on whether future
courts use an individualized approach as mandated by the ADA
146. See id. at 514 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
147. See id. at 514-15.
148. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 364 (6th ed. 1993).
149. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY (R. F. Patterson ed., 1991).
150. See Locke, supra note 3, at 110.
151. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 509-11 (1999).
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or a case by case analysis as suggested by the EEOC guidelines,
individuals taking medications which result in serious side ef-
fects may be excluded from the ADA, even if those side effects
are severe. 152 As the majority in Sutton suggests, it is essential
when "a person is taking measures to correct for... a physical
or mental impairment [that] the effects of those measures - both
positive and negative - be taken into account when judging
whether that person is 'substantially limited' in a major life ac-
tivity and thus 'disabled' under the Act."153
A major area of concern is that courts may determine disa-
bility based solely on whether the impairment is generally con-
sidered correctable. However, the fact that an impairment is
generally considered correctable, does not mean that in any
given case, it ceases to limit a major life activity. According to
the Sutton analysis, both corrected and uncorrected impair-
ments are subject to a further analysis of whether the impair-
ment substantially limits a major life activity. 54 Since the
requirement under Sutton continues to be a substantial limita-
tion of a major life activity, it seems unreasonable to confuse the
issue by questioning whether or not to view the impairment in
its corrected state. A more appropriate test would be to deter-
mine disability based on a fact-specific inquiry of such factors as
whether medications or corrective measures are readily availa-
ble, and whether they allow the person to function as an aver-
age person in the population. Some impairments are more
readily correctable than others; for example, vision impair-
ments that are easily mitigated by corrective lenses or medica-
tions taken for chronic headaches.' 55
Additionally, even when mitigating measures are used to
treat an impairment, the resulting condition may remain un-
corrected. Some individuals may stop using mitigating mea-
sures because of the risk of deleterious future health effects. An
individual's choice not to use mitigating measures may be based
on several factors: the risk of the mitigating measures, the cost
of the measures, and the side effects of those measures, as de-
152. See id. at 484.
153. Id. at 482.
154. See id. at 488-89.
155. See id. at 513-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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scribed in McAlindin v. County of San Diego.156 In McAlindin,
the plaintiff suffered from psychiatric impairments, including
anxiety disorders and panic attacks, which left him essentially
paralyzed and unable to interact.157 As a result of his illness, he
was forced out of his position as a systems analyst with the
County's Housing and Community Development Department. 158
Without his medication he was unable to function and even
with aggressive medications and psychotherapy, the symptoms
of his illness persisted and caused a side effect of extreme drow-
siness. 159 The court grappled with the issue of how such an im-
pairment should be analyzed after Sutton, where the condition
persists despite the use of medication and where side-effects
continue to substantially limit major life activities. 160 Ulti-
mately, the facts alleged in McAlindin bring this case within
the corrected impairment category which was held to be unpro-
tected by Sutton.161
Finally, defining disabilities in their "mitigated" state may
produce the anomalous result that individuals with cured im-
pairments are protected under the Act, while those with treata-
ble impairments remain unprotected. In School Board of
Nassau County v. Arline,162 the Court held that an elementary
school teacher who no longer had an impairment, but tested
positive for tuberculosis and was therefore contagious to others,
was protected under the ADA.163 By using the third prong, "re-
garded as," the fully cured individual was protected, yet those
who have prevailed in controlling their impairment through the
use of mitigating measures may be left unprotected. For exam-
ple, in Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,164 the Supreme Court
determined that, in addition to external mitigating measures
such as medication and corrective devices, mitigating measures
that are a result of the body's adaptation to an impairment
must be considered when making the determination of disabil-
156. 192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999).
157. See id. at 1230-31.
158. See id. at 1232.
159. See id. at 1231-32.
160. See McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1236.
161. See id. at 1236.
162. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
163. See id. at 282.
164. 527 U.S. 555, 564-65 (1999).
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ity.165 The plaintiff, Kirkingburg, had prevailed in overcoming
his disability so that he would be otherwise qualified, but once
the impairment was mitigated, he was no longer protected by
the ADA.166
B. Burden on the employer to justify safety standards while
remaining in compliance with the ADA
Employers risk liability under one federal law for not en-
forcing government safety standards and under another federal
law for enforcing those same standards. 167 The Occupational
Health and Safety Act ("OSHA") and the ADA were designed
with different policy objectives in mind and compliance with
both Federal Acts often causes conflict. 168 The ADA's purpose is
to expand opportunities and provide protection for people with
disabilities, 69 while OSHA's goal is safety in the workplace. 70
An employer may have difficulty complying with both stan-
dards, since disabled individuals may be at higher risk for acci-
dents in the work environment. 171 For instance, a conflict can
arise when an employee is precluded from wearing special
safety glasses but the glasses are required to accommodate an
impairment. 172 If an employer fires the employee in compliance
with the OSHA requirement for safety glasses, the employer
may be liable under the ADA for not accommodating the em-
ployee. 173 Likewise, where an employee has a communicable
disease, the employer must insure that he takes all precaution-
ary measures to prevent spread of the disease, while at the
same time insuring that he does not engage in discrimination
by singling out the employee or by treating him differently. The
employer may be faced with a choice of whether to violate the
ADA by firing the employee or to face liability for negligence,
should he or his fellow employees be injured or infected. 74
165. See id. at 565-66.
166. See id. at 556.
167. See Gaskill, supra note 57, at 1030-31.
168. See id. at 1030-31.
169. See id. at 1030-32.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See Gaskill, supra note 57, at 1031.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 1031-32.
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Employers may respond to a discrimination claim under
the ADA by defending that the employee poses a "direct threat"
to other employees in the workplace. 175 They can decline to hire
or refuse reasonable accommodations if they can prove that the
employee would pose a health or safety risk to other employ-
ees. 176 In order to have a defense under the ADA, the employer
would have to meet the considerable burden of proving that the
disabled employee posed a "direct threat," usually by demon-
strating that he is at a higher risk of causing workplace acci-
dents because of his disability. Because the determination of
direct threat is a difficult one to prove, it will likely result in
litigation over whether the employer merely "regarded" the em-
ployee as an undue safety risk.
The 1999 U.S. Supreme Court case Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirk-
ingburg 77 illustrates the conflict between compliance with the
ADA and safety standards. 78 In Albertson's, the employee,
Kirkingburg, was blind in one eye due to a condition called am-
blioplia and had learned to compensate for it through a subcon-
scious mechanism which left him with normal vision when
using both eyes.' 79 Kirkingburg was fired when he failed to
meet Department of Transportation ("DOT") safety standards
because his eyesight could not be medically corrected.'80 Al-
though he had obtained a waiver in the past because of his nat-
ural ability to compensate for the impairment, Albertson's
presently failed to grant him a waiver of the DOT require-
ment.' 8 ' The Court ruled that an employer that has a job quali-
fication that requires an employee to meet a federal safety
regulation does not have to justify that requirement, where it
can be waived in a particular case. 8 2 Kirkingburg had argued
that his condition fell under the definition of disability because,
175. See How to Hire Right and Fire Right Under the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, supra note 55.
176. See id.
177. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
178. See id. at 558.
179. See id. at 559.
180. See id. at 560-61.
181. See id. at 560.
182. See Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 577-78.
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due to his monocular vision, he had a different method of using
his vision than the general population. 8 3
The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the relationship
between the impairment and the major life activity was based
not on whether the person performed the major life activity dif-
ferently, but rather on whether the activity was substantially
limiting. 8 4 Furthermore, the Court reasoned, although most
people with his condition would be considered disabled, Kirk-
ingburg did not prove that he was substantially limited, as re-
quired under the ADA. 8 5  The Court stated that the
subconscious mechanisms that Kirkingburg had developed to
compensate for his vision impairment precluded him from pro-
tection under the ADA.'8 6 Yet, Albertson's was not required to
defend its compliance with DOT standards, since it was re-
quired by law to comply with those very standards. 8 7
C. The relationship between the burden of showing that
selection standards are based on "the essential
functions" of the job and the ability to show that
the impaired person is "otherwise qualified"
To be considered "otherwise qualified," an employee must
be able to satisfy the basic prerequisites of his employment posi-
tion. 88 A selection standard will not be upheld if it screens out
potential employees who are otherwise qualified, because rea-
sonable selection standards are a necessary component of being
otherwise qualified. 8 9 A person is not otherwise qualified when
he is unable to perform the essential function of the job due to a
mental or physical disability. 90 The essential functions under
the ADA are "the fundamental job duties of the employment po-
sition held or desired," and "not the marginal duties of the
183. See id. at 561.
184. See id. at 565-66.
185. See id. at 566-67.
186. See id. at 565-66.
187. See Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 578-80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
188. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(m) (2000).
189. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)-(b)(6) (1994).
190. See Janet E.Goldberg, Employers With Mental and Emotional Problems -
Workplace Security and Implications of the State Discrimination Laws, The Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, Worker's Compensation and Re-
lated Issues, 24 STETSON L. REV. 201, 206 (1994).
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job."191 For example, a "typist with a mental disability who
types forty-five words-per-minute would not be qualified for a
word processing job that requires the ability to type sixty
words-per-minute (provided the employer actually had and le-
gitimately enforced such a requirement).' 1 92 However, it is
often difficult to differentiate between those criteria that are
considered essential functions and those that constitute non-
essential functions for a specific employment position.
An employer is permitted under the ADA "to decide [that]
physical characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise to
the level of impairment - such as one's height, build, or singing
voice - are preferable to others, just as it is free to decide that
some limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments
make individuals less than ideally suited for a job."193 However,
it is only fair that where an uncorrected physical attribute is
deemed a valid job disqualification, that the court be required to
use that same uncorrected standard in determining whether
the person fits into the definition of disability, such that he is
protected by the ADA. For example, if United Air Lines regards
petitioners as unqualified because they do not meet the vision
requirements without glasses, the Court should "use uncor-
rected vision as the basis for evaluating the petitioners' life ac-
tivity of seeing."194
Even if an individual does not fall under the subsection
(2)(A) definition of a disability, he may fall under subsection
(2)(C), "regarded as" having a disability. 95 In Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, Inc.,196 the plaintiff, Murphy, was fired as a
mechanic for United Parcel Service because he was unable to
meet the job requirement of obtaining a Department of Trans-
portation Health Certificate because of his high blood pres-
sure. 97 The Court ruled that mitigating measures should be
considered when determining whether an individual's impair-
ment substantially limits one or more major life activities. 98
191. Id. at 206.
192. Id.
193. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 490-91 (1999).
194. Id. at 511 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195. See ADA, 42 U.S.C § 12102(2)(C).
196. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
197. See id at 519-20.
198. See id. at 521.
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Although his successfully treated high blood pressure did not
allow him to fall under either the first prong definition of a disa-
bility or the third prong, "regarded as" having a disability, Mur-
phy failed to meet the essential requirements of the job based
on his impairment in its unmitigated state. 199 Yet he was "oth-
erwise qualified" to meet the requirements of his job, based on
twenty years of successful employment as a mechanic.200 Rea-
son would seem to dictate that if a disability does not result in a
substantial limitation of the major life activity of working, the
termination of the employee is unjustified in the first place.
Additionally, to determine that an employee is not substan-
tially limited in the major life activity of working, an employer
must be careful to exclude the employee only from a narrow and
specific job function, not a broad class of jobs. 201 In Murphy, the
plaintiff was excluded only from his job as a mechanic, but not
from other jobs within the company.20 2 Therefore, the Court
reasoned, his preclusion did not constitute being "substantially
limited in the major life activity of working."20 3 Under the anal-
ysis in Sutton, the essential function must be narrow and even
unique in order to determine that the individual is not other-
wise qualified. 20 4 Future judicial decisions must resolve the
contradiction by insuring that an individual who is deemed in-
capable of performing the "essential functions" of a job, cannot,
at the same time, be deemed "otherwise qualified" for that same
job under the ADA.
D. Although the Sutton ruling is generally viewed as a win
for employers, it leaves the employer making important
employment decisions while uncertain about whether they
have complied with the law
Although Sutton may decrease the number of employees
who come under the protection of the ADA, it may also serve to
increase employers' uncertainty as to the standards with which
they must comply. While narrowing the scope of protected disa-
199. See id. at 521-22.
200. See id. at 524-25.
201. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2 (j)(3) (2000).
202. See Murphy, 527 U.S. at 524.
203. Id. at 525.
204. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 457 U.S. 471, 491-92 (1999).
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bilities will allow employers to avoid some frivolous lawsuits, it
will almost certainly create further conflicts for employers in
balancing business concerns with concerns for complying with
the ADA. New ambiguities resulting from changed standards
will add confusion to old ambiguities that have never been
clearly interpreted. Employers who are uncertain as to what
constitutes a disability under the Act can no longer look to the
EEOC for clarification, because certain aspects of the guidelines
do not still apply. Additionally, employers are unclear as to
whether or not an employee is "otherwise qualified" under the
ADA to perform the "essential functions" of the job, "with or
without reasonable accommodation." 20 5 Increased uncertainty
on both sides may negatively impact employers' attitudes to-
ward the disabled, which would reverse the significant improve-
ment in public perception toward disabled workers brought
about by the ADA.
Several issues frequently arise in employment situations,
which are crucial for the employer to understand in order to
comply with the ADA. Employment decisions should be made
much as they had been made prior to Sutton, with a careful
analysis of the potential legal problems associated with the
ADA.20 6 "[T]he underlying premise of the ADA is that employ-
ment decisions should be made in a neutral manner, focusing
upon an individual's ability to do the job without regard to non-
job related criteria."207 However, since a person's disability may
effect his ability to perform the specific job in question, the pa-
rameters of the ADA must be carefully analyzed to avoid
confusion. 208
The ADA and EEOC guidelines provide employers with ba-
sic information to help them comply with the ADA during pre-
employment and testing stages. 20 9 Since equal opportunities for
the disabled extend to the hiring process, the employer must be
careful to list qualifications for the job before conducting an in-
205. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
206. See How to Hire Right and Fire Right Under the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, supra note 55.
207. Id.
208. See id.
209. See Richardson, supra note 77, at 191-92 .
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terview (e.g., a CPA certification, a college diploma).210 If the
advertisement includes any information about the require-
ments of the position, the essential job functions should also be
included.211 References to a certain level of physical or mental
ability should be omitted from advertisements unless an essen-
tial job function requires them.212 An advertisement may state
that certain qualities are preferred, but this could lead to an
ADA claim where the "preferred" criteria are simply a means of
screening out disabled persons. 213
An employer is prohibited at the hiring stage from request-
ing information relating to any disability that the individual
may have. Certain topics should not be addressed in the inter-
view process: the nature or severity of a disability; the existence
of past or present medical problems; whether the applicant has
filed any worker's compensation claims; why the applicant was
absent from his previous job; and whether the applicant is an
alcoholic or a drug user.214 An employer may request documen-
tation of a disability at the interview stage only where he has a
reasonable belief that the applicant will require reasonable ac-
commodation. 21 5 The reasonable belief may be based on "an ob-
vious disability," a "voluntary disclo[surel," or a request for
"reasonable accommodation" by the applicant. 21 6 In these situa-
tions, the employer may ask whether the applicant needs rea-
sonable accommodation and what type of accommodation is
needed. 21 7 For example, if an applicant with cancer states that
he will need breaks during the day to take medication, the em-
ployer may ask how frequently he will need the breaks or how
210. See How to Hire Right and Fire Right Under the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, supra note 55.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See Gaskill, supra note 57, at 981.
215. See How to Hire Right and Fire Right Under the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, supra note 55.
216. See id.
217. See id. See e.g., Beck v. University of Wis. B. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130,
1135 (7th Cir. 1996).
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long the breaks must be. 218 However, he may not ask questions
regarding the applicant's medical condition. 219
Pre-offer medical tests to determine physical or mental im-
pairments are prohibited by the ADA, unless those tests are re-
lated to the ability to perform the essential job function. 220 An
employer may not use a test that disproportionately screens out
individuals with disabilities and tests are permitted only if they
are required of all applicants. 221 Medical information is confi-
dential whether or not the applicant is accepted for the job.222
Before an employer may decide to terminate an employee,
in addition to carefully analyzing the requirements of the ADA,
it is advisable to have written documentation as to whether an
accommodation was requested and as to all steps taken to pro-
vide the accommodation to that employee. 223 The question that
usually comes up in a termination context is whether regular
attendance constitutes an "essential job function," such that
noncompliance may justify termination.224 Regular attendance
is generally considered to be an essential job function and an
employer can require employees to come to work on a regular
basis. 225 In Tyndall v. National Education Center,226 the court
held that an employee who was not able to meet regular and
reliable attendance requirements of a job was not considered an
"otherwise qualified" individual under the ADA.227 In some sit-
uations, however, attendance may not be considered an essen-
tial job function, especially in the absence of a uniformly applied
policy by the company.228 For instance, in Dutton v. Johnson
City Board of Commissioners,229 the court held that the re-
218. See How to Hire Right and Fire Right Under the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, supra note 55.
219. See id.
220. See Gaskill, supra note 57, at 982-83.
221. See The Americans With Disabilities Act: Great Progress, Greater Poten-
tial, supra note 37, at 1605.
222. See How to Hire Right and Fire Right Under the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, supra note 55.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See Locke, supra note 3, at 128.
226. 31 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1995).
227. See How to Hire Right and Fire Right Under the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, supra note 55.
228. See id.
229. 859 F. Supp. 498 (D. Kan. 1994).
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quested accommodation was not unreasonable where an em-
ployee with migraine headaches requested that he use
scheduled sick leave and vacation time to cover his absences. 230
Additionally, the ability to "adhere to production and pro-
fessional standards" of the job are usually held to be a "neces-
sary component of being otherwise qualified."231 For example,
an employee diagnosed as manic depressive, who was unable to
maintain an objectively acceptable standard of behavior in the
work environment, was held not to be "otherwise qualified."232
To be "otherwise qualified," the individual must be capable of
performing the essential functions of the job.233 However, a ter-
mination based on a failure to adhere to professional standards
is not lawful where it has been motivated by discriminatory
bias.234
E. Conflict between the text of the Act, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act (EEOC), and the
Supreme Court's holding
Although the ADA does not specifically discuss whether
courts are required to consider mitigating measures in making
the threshold determination of disability, legislative and judi-
cial authority have consistently held that corrective measures
should not be considered in the determination. 235 The legisla-
tive history of the ADA makes it "clear that Congress intended
the Act to cover individuals who could perform all of their major
life activities only with the help of ameliorative measures."236
The Senate Report states that "whether a person has a disabil-
ity should be assessed without regard to the availability of miti-
gating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or
auxiliary aids."237 The Report illustrates that individuals with
230. See id. at 508.
231. See How to Hire Right and Fire Right Under the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, supra note 55.
232. Carrozza v. Howard County Md., 45 F.2d 425, 425 (4th Cir. 1995).
233. See How to Hire Right and Fire Right Under the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, supra note 55.
234. See id.
235. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 499-500 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
236. Id. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 499-500 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 101-116, at
23 (1989)).
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epilepsy or diabetes, for example, are often denied jobs based on
employers' negative attitudes, even though their impairments
are completely controlled by medication. 238 Likewise, the Re-
port of the House Committee on Education and Labor states
"[w]hether a person has a disability should be assessed without
regard to the availability of mitigating measures." 239 Addition-
ally, the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance, the Department of Jus-
tice240 and the Department of Transportation 241 have issued
guidelines adopting this same definition of disability. Finally,
eight of the nine courts of appeals who have addressed the issue
have held that the intent of the statute was to define the im-
pairment in its unmitigated state.242
The only holding contrary to this line of authority is the
Tenth Circuit's opinion that the Supreme Court affirmed in Sut-
ton.243 The Sutton analysis specifically rejects the EEOC guide-
lines regarding mitigating measures, stating "the approach
adopted by the agency guidelines - that persons are to be eval-
uated in their hypothetical uncorrected state - is an impermis-
sible interpretation of the ADA." 244 The Court reasoned that, if
a person is taking measures to correct his impairment, the "ef-
fects of those measures - both positive and negative - must be
taken into account when judging whether the person is 'sub-
stantially limited' in a major life activity and thus 'disabled'
under the Act."245 The Court relied on three separate provisions
of the ADA which lead to the conclusion that the disability anal-
ysis should be made based on whether an individual is substan-
tially limited in a major life activity when the impairment is
viewed in its mitigated state.246 First, the Court reasoned that
since the phrase "'substantially limits' appears in the Act in the
present indicative verb form,... [it] is properly read as requir-
ing that a person be presently - not potentially or hypotheti-
238. See id. (quoting S.. REP. No. 101-116, at 24 (1989)).
239. See id at 500 (quoting H.R.REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, p.52, reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334 (1990)).
240. See Sutton 527 U.S. at 502 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241. See id.
242. See id. at 495-96.
243. See id. at 477.
244. Id. at 482.
245. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
246. See id.
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cally - substantially limited in order to demonstrate a
disability."247 Second, the Court stated that since the determi-
nation of disability is an "individualized inquiry" under the
ADA, it "is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the
impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that im-
pairment on the life of the individual."248 Third, the majority
reasoned that the findings associated with the ADA enactment
"require the conclusion that Congress did not intend to bring
under the statute's protection all those whose uncorrected con-
ditions amount to disabilities" because some "43 [million] Amer-
icans have one or more physical or mental disabilities."249 The
Court went on to say that viewing individuals in their corrected
state will not exclude certain disabled persons who are worthy
of protection, because only those mitigated impairments that
are no longer substantially limiting will cease to be protected. 250
The majority suggests that those individuals that simply have
improvements in their condition will continue to be protected
under the Act if they meet the other requirements of the ADA
definition.25 1
The legislative history, including committee reports, uni-
form agency regulations, and judicial opinions are consistent
with the legislative goals of the Act.252 If narrowing the scope of
coverage under the ADA is a reaction to the sheer number of
potential litigants, differentiating between corrected and uncor-
rected disabilities will not solve the problem. Historically, "it
has been a familiar canon of statutory construction that reme-
dial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its
purposes."253 As the dissent in Sutton suggests, the words of
the statute must be interpreted in light of the purpose that Con-
gress sought to serve, which was "the elimination of discrimina-
tion against individuals with disabilities."254
247. Id.
248. Id. at 483 (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j)).
249. Id. at 484.
250. Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 488. (1999)
251. See id.
252. See id. at 502 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
253. See id. at 504 (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)).
254. Id. at 497 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §12112(a)) (Stevens, J. Dissenting).
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F. Clarification needed for the terms "reasonable
accommodation" and "undue hardship"
Many of the terms in the ADA were intentionally left unde-
fined, and their meanings remain vague after Sutton.255
Though the ADA and the EEOC regulations provide a "basic
framework for understanding the employer's obligation to ac-
commodate a disabled individual ...the courts will set the
boundaries that define employers' responsibilities through judi-
cial interpretation of who is a 'qualified individual with a disa-
bility." 256 The two terms in the ADA which cause the greatest
confusion and which result in the most variation in judicial
opinion are "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship."
The most fact-intensive inquiry under the ADA surrounds
the question of whether reasonable accommodation" was made
for the disabled employee. However, there are certain general
rules that the employer should consider in every analysis.
First, the employer has a right to demand verification of the
disability for which the employee requires accommodation. 257
This generally comes in the form of written verification of the
impairment by a physician or psychiatrist. 258 For example, in
Dumas v. Keebler Co.,259 the court held that it was not a viola-
tion of the ADA when the employer required that the employee
verify her need for a handicapped parking spot.260 Second, the
employee must participate in the accommodation process by
providing information regarding the form of accommodation
needed. 261 In Beck v. University of Wisconsin Board of Re-
gents,262 the court held that the employer was not liable for fail-
ing to provide reasonable accommodation, where an employee
did not provide the specific information necessary to make ap-
255. See The Americans With Disabilities Act: Great Progress, Greater Poten-
tial, supra note 37, at 1615.
256. Richardson, supra note 77, at 191.
257. See How to Hire Right and Fire Right Under the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, supra note 55.
258. See id.
259. 5 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 69 (M.D. Ga. 1995).
260. See id.
261. See How to Hire Right and Fire Right Under the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, supra note 55.
262. 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1996).
302 [Vol. 21:271
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol21/iss1/5
AFTERMATH OF SUTTON
propriate accommodations. 263 Third, the employer is required
to provide only reasonable accommodation, not the best possible
accommodation. 264 The courts and federal guidelines have gen-
erally defined this to mean that, although the employee's pref-
erence should be given consideration, the employer has "the
ultimate discretion to choose between effective accommodations
and may choose the less expensive accommodation or the ac-
commodation that is easier to provide." 265 In Vande Zande v.
Wisconsin Department of Administration,266 the court found a
lap-top computer for the employee to use at home to be a rea-
sonable accommodation, although the employee had requested
a desk-top computer and a laser printer. 267 Fourth, the em-
ployer is generally not obligated to reallocate the basic require-
ments of the job. 268 The EEOC provides that "[a]n employer or
other covered entity is not required to reallocate essential func-
tions."269 The essential functions are those requirements of the
job that would have to be performed by the employee, "with or
without reasonable accommodation." 270 Fifth, the requirement
of reasonable accommodation is dependent on the employer's
knowledge of the disability.271 Courts have rejected claims of
discrimination under the ADA where the employee has not been
able to show that the employer had knowledge of the employee's
impairment.27 2 For instance, in R.G.H. v. Abbott Laborato-
ries,273 the terminated employee's ADA claim failed where he
was unable to prove that his employers were aware that he was
HIV positive when they fired him.274 Sixth, employer liability
will depend on whether accommodations were made within a
263. See How to Hire Right and Fire Right Under the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, supra note 55.
264. See id.
265. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (4) (2000).
266. 44 F. 3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
267. See id. at 543-44.
268. See How to Hire Right and Fire Right Under the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, supra note 55.
269. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2 (o) (2000).
270. See How to Hire Right and Fire Right Under the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, supra note 55.
271. See id.
272. See id. (citing R.G.H. v. Abbott Labs., 4 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 289 (N.D. Ill.
1995).
273. R.G.H. v. Abbott Labs., 4 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 289 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
274. See id. at 289.
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"reasonable time," depending on the situation. 275 For example,
three months was held to be a "reasonable time" for a company
to respond to a request for special computer equipment to ac-
commodate a disabled employee, where the equipment had to be
authorized, researched, purchased and installed.276
To defend against a claim for failure to provide a reasona-
ble accommodation, the employer may allege that either the ac-
commodation would pose an "undue hardship" to the business
enterprise, that selection standards are "consistent with busi-
ness necessity," or that the individual poses a "direct threat" to
persons in the workplace. 277 The determination of a direct
threat is an individualized inquiry that requires a balance of
factors including the nature and duration of the risk, the
probability of potential harm, and the alternatives available to
mitigate the risk.278 For instance, in Scoles v. Mercy Health
Corp. of Southeastern Pennsylvania,279 the court held that an
employer was justified in restricting a surgeon's practice be-
cause of his HIV status.28 0 Although the risk of transmission to
a patient was low, the magnitude of the potential harm was so
significant that the court found a direct threat.28' A clarifica-
tion of the definitions by Congress would allow employers to
balance the requirements and practitioners to accurately evalu-
ate whether employers are in complience with the ADA.
G. The "case by case" analysis is in direct conflict with the
EEOC's individualized approach
There has been a gradual change in judicial perspective
since the first ADA cases were litigated.28 2 Early cases focused
on the issues of "employer motive or employee qualifications,"
275. See How to Hire Right and Fire Right Under the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, supra note 55.
276. See Davis v. York Int'l., Inc. 2 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1810 (D. Md. 1993).
277. The Americans With Disabilities Act: Great Progress, Greater Potential,
supra note 37, at 1606-07. See e.g., Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 541
A.2d 682 (1988).
278. Id. at 1607. See also School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273 (1987).
279. See Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp. of Southeastern Pa., 887 F. Supp. 765
(E.D. Pa. 1994).
280. See id. at 771-72.
281. See id. at 772.
282. See Locke, supra note 3, at 112-13.
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rather than on the issue of whether a disability was present.28 3
The general assumption was that courts would accept a plain-
tiffs disability status without further analysis of the definition,
based on the guidelines produced by the ADA Committee Re-
ports and the interpretive guidelines to the EEOC. 284 Although
both denied the guidelines to be a "laundry list" of disabilities,
they contained a non-exhaustive list of named disabilities, in-
cluding examples of physical conditions that constituted per se
disabilities. 285 Additionally, there was a "significant body of Re-
habilitation Act case law indicating that courts were willing to
accept the concept of per se disability status,"28 6 resulting in
employers who were reluctant to challenge the determination
based on the existing definition of disability.28 7
More recently, courts have responded by "becom[ing] in-
creasingly intolerant of what they perceive to be attempts by
minimally impaired individuals to manipulate the law."28 8 In
an effort to minimize the proliferation of claims for minor im-
pairments, courts may have gone too far and excluded legiti-
mate disability claims.28 9 Employers have bolstered their side
of the disability issue "by seizing upon the language in the
EEOC guidelines which states that a determination should be
made on a case by case basis."290 This is based on the premise
that that "the determination of whether an individual has a dis-
ability, is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the
impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that im-
pairment on the life of the individual."291 Based on these prem-
ises, employers have increasingly used the "case by case
analysis" language to contest the disability issue.292 In this
way, courts have "dismantle [d] the per se disability roster," crit-
icizing the EEOC's regulations as contrary to the ADA's individ-
ualized approach. 293 Replacing the named disabilities with a
283. Id. at 112.
284. See id. at 112-113.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 113.
287. Locke, supra note 3, at 113.
288. Id. at 114.
289. See id. at 114.
290. Id. at 113.
291. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (2000).
292. Locke, supra note 3, at 113-15.
293. Id. at 114.
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case by case model has served to narrow the scope of disabili-
ties, thus decreasing the number of disability claims for impair-
ments that are generally thought to be correctable. 294
However, the Sutton Court held that the EEOC guideline's
directive that the determination of a disability should be made
on a case by case basis "is an impermissible interpretation of
the ADA."295 The Court argued that the EEOC interpretation is
likely to lead to "the anomalous result ... [that] courts and em-
ployers could not consider any negative side effects suffered by
the individual in the use of mitigating measures, even when
those side effects are very severe."296 It further stated that the
agency's approach would cause courts to make a disability de-
termination based on stereotypes about how that disability gen-
erally affects individuals, rather than how any particular
individual is affected. 297 Under this analysis, the majority rea-
soned, courts would "almost certainly find all diabetics to be dis-
abled, because if they failed to monitor their blood sugar levels
and administer insulin, they would almost certainly be substan-
tially limited in one or more major life activities."298 The court
favored the mandate in subsection (2)(A) of the ADA that an
individualized approach be used, requiring that disabilities be
evaluated "with respect to an individual."299
The altering of judicial perspective to an individualized ap-
proach may actually serve to invite rather than to curtail litiga-
tion. While other anti-discrimination statutes do not require
proof that a plaintiff is a member of a protected class, the ADA
requires that each individual prove he has a disability in each
case.300 Although this is not difficult where there is an obvious
physical disability, it is much more difficult to ascertain where
the disability is "hidden" and "without recognizable manifesta-
tions."301 Most ADA litigation to date has dealt with hidden im-
pairments, such as back injuries, headaches, and neurological
294. See id.
295. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
296. Id. at 484.
297. See id. at 483.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See Locke, supra note 3, at 114-15.
301. Id. at 115.
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or emotional disorders. 3 2 Likewise, since mitigated impair-
ments are frequently hidden and therefore difficult for employ-
ers to recognize, it is likely that "mitigated" disabilities will
make up the bulk of future ADA cases.
Furthermore, legal scholars are in disagreement as to
whether or not regarding individuals in their mitigated state
results in a tendency to improperly group them according to
their impairment. Since standards remain unclear, each em-
ployer and employee will approach litigation expecting to win
on his interpretation of the facts, which will have the ultimate
effect of increasing litigation.
H. Sutton may shift the balance back to the employer, in
contrast to the original intention of the ADA
In light of the Supreme Court ruling, the prima facie stan-
dard applied by courts in determining whether an individual
has a disability may run counter to the original intent of the
statute. The current judicial approach may place an unreasona-
ble burden on the plaintiff, leading to an unbalance in favor of
employers in ADA litigation. 30 3 In their concern to eradicate
frivolous lawsuits, the ADA has become increasingly narrowed
to the point where it is no longer effective in its original goal of
"aiding disadvantaged individuals' integration into the job mar-
ket."30 4 The statute may ultimately serve to exclude those indi-
viduals with serious impairments that it was specifically
designed to benefit. Individuals with "corrected" disabilities
who are left unprotected after Sutton, are often those individu-
als who have persevered in overcoming substantial limitations
in major life activities through medication, adaptation, or reha-
bilitation. In response to concerns that too many people with
minor or correctable conditions were bringing lawsuits under
the ADA, the courts seem to be "ratcheting up the prima facie
standard" for qualifying under the Act.305 The shift may be due
in part to society's evolving stereotypes as to what is considered
a disability.30 6 Though the concern of the ADA was that individ-
302. See id.
303. See id. at 112-15.
304. Id. at 108-09.
305. See Locke, supra note 3, at 108.
306. Id. at 146 n.34.
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uals with disabilities not be excluded from employment based
on stereotypes about their impairments, individuals may now
be excluded from the protected class based on stereotypes about
certain correctable impairments. 3 7 Courts have expressed a
concern that only deserving persons with true disabilities
should be protected by the ADA, which suggests "a preconceived
notion of the parameters of the protected class."308
Additionally, the courts are increasingly faced with non-
traditional disability claims brought under the ADA.30 9 The
most common disability claim (approximately 31% of all claims)
in the first year of the ADA, involved back impairments, e.g.,
worker's compensation-type claims.310 A study performed by
David Blanck contrasted that statistic with claims involving
more traditionally based disabilities, such as mental retarda-
tion, HIV, cancer, diabetes, and mental illness.31 1 The study
concluded that the majority of cases regarding more serious dis-
abilities had been noticeably absent from ADA litigation. 312
Blanck's study concluded that categorizing people by the name
of the disability "leads to value judgments [being] made by big-
ots and latitudinarians alike as to what should be considered a
disability."313
In an attempt to weed out allegedly undeserving appli-
cants, the courts may create an unreasonable burden for plain-
tiffs, which will lead to an unbalanced process which favors
employers. 314 The unanticipated result may be to steer the fo-
cus away from the ADA's original intent, which was to "aid the
disabled individual's integration into the job market."315 Like-
wise, courts may leave unprotected the group of disabled indi-
307. See id. at 113-15.
308. Id. at 146 n.34. See also Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446,
1460 (7th Cir. 1995) (Roth brought a suit under the ADA for strabismus).
309. See Peter David Blanck, Employment Integration, Economic Opportu-
nity, and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Empirical Study from 1990-1993, 79
IOWA L. REV. 853, 921 (1994).
310. See id. (citing EEOC, National Database Charge Receipt Listing, Aug. 8,
1993, at 55).
311. See Blanck, supra note 309, at 921-22.
312. See id.
313. Locke, supra note 3, at 146 n.34.
314. See id. at 108-9.
315. Id. at 109.
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viduals who have correctable impairments, yet are still
suffering from discrimination.
I. Sutton ruling may have a devastating effect on HIV
positive persons
A pre Sutton case, Doe v. Kohn Nast,316 is an example of the
"divergence between statutory standard and lay perception"
which individuals with disabilities may confront in future
cases.317 This case presented the issue of whether an HIV posi-
tive person who was asymptomatic was protected under the
purview of the ADA.318 The court determined that even without
symptoms, the plaintiff had a physiological disorder of the blood
and lymphatic system, and was thus protected under the
ADA.319 By asserting that HIV-positive individuals are covered
under the first prong of the ADA, courts had stretched the stat-
utory language to fit the disease. 320 If not covered under the
first prong, courts have generally held that HIV-positive per-
sons are disabled under the third prong, i.e. that the employer
has "regarded" the employee as disabled.321 Even though a-
symptomatic, the court here has made HIV-positive status com-
port with the definition "substantially limits" one or more "ma-
jor life activities."322 The danger after Sutton is that future
courts may interpret HIV status as the judge did in Kohn when
he likened it to hypertension. 323 He stated:
Tens of millions of Americans walk around and live full and active
lives, hypertense though they may be .. . I must read with care
the definitions of disability that Congress and the EEOC gave us,
and decide whether this plaintiffs disease and its symptoms fall
within one or more of those express statutory and regulatory defi-
nitions, as anomalous as the statutory result might seem to
some.
324
316. 862 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
317. Rhonda K. Jenkins, Square Pegs, Round Holes: HIV and The Americans
with Disabilities Act, 20 S. ILL. U. L. J. 637, 648 (1996).
318. See id. at 644.
319. See id. at 645.
320. See id. at 647.
321. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c) (1994).
322. See Jenkins, supra note 317, at 646.
323. See Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1319-20 (E.D. Pa.
1994).
324. Id. at 1319-20.
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Similarly, after Sutton, courts may "deem it more reasona-
ble to exclude an individual HIV carrier from the statute's pro-
tection, rather than further attenuate the plain meaning of the
ADA. '325 The alternative is to stretch the definition of disability
to accommodate AIDS specifically, which would create a system
where we treat individuals as members of a group with like dis-
abilities, and provide them with protection under the Act. This
would run counter to the ADA's mandate of individualized in-
quiry. However, some action is necessary, as HIV positive indi-
viduals are uniquely vulnerable to discrimination based on fear
and stereotype. The worldwide estimate of AIDS cases now ex-
ceeds 10 million, with additional millions estimated to be in-
fected with the HIV virus.326 The reports and statistical
predictions require that courts' adopt a rational precedent with
which to deal with the inevitably large number of HIV discrimi-
nation cases in the future. To insure a consistent statutory ap-
proach, Congress should create a fourth prong under the ADA.
The prong should expressly designate HIV positive status,
symptomatic as well as asymptomatic, as a covered disability
under the ADA. In its absence, HIV positive individuals "will
be at the mercy of uncertain judicial interpretation and vulner-
able to the discrimination the ADA seeks to prevent."327
PART V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines created a
fundamental change in the law regarding the scope of coverage
for persons with disabilities. In an attempt to curtail frivolous
litigation, the Court has narrowed the coverage under the Act to
those disabilities which, in their mitigated state, continue to fall
within the definition of disability. By doing so, they may be ex-
cluding worthy individuals who simply cannot meet the thresh-
old definition because their impairment is one generally
recognized as controllable by medication or medical aids. This
may result in treating individuals as members of a group with
that particular "correctable" impairment, which is itself a viola-
tion of the ADA. Furthermore, the holding leaves the already
325. Jenkins, supra note 317, at 648.
326. See id. at 649-50.
327. Id. at 650.
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ambiguous standards in the Act open to further questions of in-
terpretation for future courts and practitioners. To make the
disability analysis consistent with the inclusive spirit of the
ADA, employers must have the clear and practical guidelines
necessary to balance important business decisions with compli-
ance with disability law. It is equally important to provide dis-
abled individuals with an understanding of their rights,
without inserting cloudy threshold definitions that effectively
keep them from getting their foot in the door. Education about
the rights of the disabled will help to promote positive employer
attitudes and public perception of disabled persons in the work-
place, which has been a significant accomplishment of ADA leg-
islation to date. Communication amongst employers and
individuals with disabilities should be directed at determining
the cause of unemployment in their communities and in deter-
mining how best to implement the ADA's provisions. The
EEOC must develop clear quantitative standards, as courts fur-
ther clarify which of the EEOC provisions still apply. In its goal
of eliminating discrimination toward the disabled in the work-
place, courts and legislature must together recast the inquiry,
not by using an exclusionary process separating those with cor-
rected disabilities from those without, but by focusing on the
critical issue - the effect of the disability on the individual's abil-
ity to perform the job.
2000]
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